Military Self-Interest in Accountability for Core International Crimes

Is it in the enlightened self-interest of armed forces to have perpetrators of core international crimes brought to justice? This anthology adds the 'carrot' perspective of self-interest or incentives to the common rhetoric of 'stick' - legal obligations and political pressures. Twenty authors from around the world discuss why military actors themselves often prefer accountability: Richard Saller, Andrew T. Cayley, William K. Lietzau, William J. Fenrick, Arne Willy Dahl, Richard J. Goldstone, Elizabeth L. Hillman, Bruce Houlder, Agus Widjojo, Marlene Mazel, Adel Maged, Kiki A. Japutra, Christopher Mahony, Christopher Jenks, Franklin D. Rosenblatt, Roberta Arnold, Róisín Burke, Elizabeth Santalla Vargas, Morten Bergsmo and SONG Tianying. This Second Edition also contains a chapter by René Provost. The self-interests presented in this book are multi-dimensional: from internal professionalisation to external legitimacy; from institutional reputation to individual honour; from operational effectiveness to strategic stakes; from historical lessons to contemporary needs; from religious beliefs to aspirations for rule of law; from minimizing civilian interference to pre-empting international scrutiny. The case is made for long-term self-interest in accountability and increased military 'ownership' in repressing core international crimes. In his foreword, William K. Lietzau observes that of "all the international community's well-intended endeavours to foster accountability and end impunity, none is more important than that addressed in this book."